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The "Further Response" filed by plaintiffs demonstrates
the lack of foundation for plaintiffs1 motion seeking the right to
file this "Further Response."

It remains that defendants1 Reply

Brief properly responded to matters presented by plaintiffs and
did not impermissibly present new matter.

This new document of

plaintiffs1 is simply plaintiffs1 effort to patch up the weakness
in its Reply Brief.
No good purpose can be served by responding to the
attacks in pages 1 and 2.
taken

This is but a repeat of the approach

in plaintiffs' Reply

Brief.

The

point

stands

that

plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts is not a Statement of Facts, but is
an argument laced with improprieties.

The plaintiff need not

refer to counsel by name to direct attacks to him. Here, the lack
of

civility

is

repeated

"misleading" of the Court.
look to the merits.

by

assertions

of

"irresponsible,"

But, let us not dwell on this, but

These matters are adequately covered in

defendants' Reply Brief and the problem their presented will be
left to the Court's good judgment upon review of the respective
briefs and the supporting record.
Plaintiffs' obvious concern about the application of the
statute of limitations is well justified.
concerned.

Plaintiffs should be

The statute of limitations is a substantial bar to

this action.

Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion,

it is not

contended by defendants that the discovery rule does not apply to
fraud actions, but it is contended the discovery rule does not
a

PPly to this fraud action.

It is fundamental that, even in a

fraud case, plaintiffs cannot stick their heads in the sand and
ignore the business realities that surround them. As explained in
one of the cases cited by plaintiffs themselves, "The discovery
rule functions as an exception to the normal application of a
statute of limitation" and it begins to run not only when
plaintiffs learn of the claim, but also when plaintiffs "in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts
which give rise to the cause of action." Klinaer v. Knightly, 791
P.2d 868 at 869 (Utah 1990).
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Plaintiffs are the ones who gave the court below various
findings to get around the statute of limitations (Findings 4648),

but

they

here

seem

puzzled

that

those

findings

are

challenged.
Here# as explained in defendants1 Opening Brief (pages
40-41), plaintiffs exercised no diligence whatever. Further, the
discovery rule should not be left to blind application and there
should be some exceptional circumstances in the case or some acts
of concealment by the defendant to warrant its application.
spite of the rehabilitative efforts in plaintiffs1

In

"Further

Response," it remains that the discovery rule should not be
applied in this particular case. The deposition testimony relied
upon

by

plaintiffs

"contradict"

the trial

testimony, but, rather, it was the other way around.

The trial

testimony,

taken

(p. 3) did

not

in full context with the prior deposition

testimony, simply harmonizes what was said and demonstrates that
there is no clear or convincing evidence to support plaintiffs'
attempt to avoid the application of the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs, here again, rely on the trial court's finding without
adequately considering the fundamental issue, whether there is
adequate support for the finding.

But, the discovery rule is a

question of law and not a question of fact, in any event.

This

Court, therefore, "need show no deference to the trial court's
- 3

ruling

on

appeal" and

Klincrer, supra.

"should

at 870.

review

it

The supposed

for

correctness."

acts of

concealment

attributed by plaintiffs (p.3) to the defendants are tenuous at
best. It was plaintiffs1 superintendent who concealed things, not
the defendants.
Discussion with respect to what was said and what was not
said to Mr. Elkington when he examined the records on New Year's
Eve will have to depend on the Court's interpretation of the
record.

Plaintiffs

interpretation.

advance

an

unduly

harsh

and

strict

Any fair-minded person, including Mr. Elkington

if he were fair minded, would have quite clearly known that he had
not been "refused" the records, and that it was a matter of the
"storage room situation and the location of those records [which]
were unknown" to Hurst and that "at that time of day and under
those circumstances, that I couldn't produce them and also that I
hadn't been released by Mr. Heaton to do so."

(R.454, at 97.)

Plaintiffs always place a convenient "twist" on the
testimony.

For example, in plaintiffs' footnote 2 at page 5

plaintiffs assert that Mr. Hurst testified he was not sure whether
there were earlier transactions. What Mr. Hurst said was: "Well,
after he finished with looking at 85 and making his summary of
that information, he asked me if there were transactions earlier
than that and I told him that I believed there could have been.
- 4 -

That I wasn't sure when my dealings with Heaton had started."
(R.454, at 97 and 156.) The reference in footnote 2 to testimony
that Elkington had not asked to see "pre-1985 records" was earlier
deposition testimony and responded to the narrow question whether
Elkington "asked to see 1984". In the next line it is clarified,
"I don't recall if there was any conversation about anything
beyond '85." (R.454, at 156.) In that same deposition, Mr. Hurst
affirmed that 1983 and 1984 records did exist.
Elkington

claims

that

he

asked

simply

(R.454, at 156.)

"for

any

earlier

information" and he claims he was told, "such information was no
longer available."

(R.452, at 134.)

The fact remains, however,

that Elkington, a well-trained and experienced certified public
accountant, made no further effort whatever beyond this New Year's
Eve visit.

It is submitted that this casual testimony and the

admitted lack of any further request or any further follow-up by
the accountant, Mr. Elkington, is less than clear and convincing
evidence.
Defendants' footnote 4 on page 13 is, indeed, a "careful
effort."

Plaintiffs' complaint

about

this effort

straining at gnats and misses the point.

(p.5) is

The point is that

although Mr. Heaton did say he could "not remember the exact time
when it was," he did affirm "but it was before or at the time" the
settlement agreement was entered into.
- 5 -

(R.451, at 123-124.)

It

is significant that after the recess, this key witness spent two
pages of testimony waffling all over the place, and yet the best
he could come up with is that he could not remember, because this
was "three years ago," further demonstrating the importance of the
statute of limitations in this case.
With respect to when the statements about "not telling"
Steelco came up, it is again submitted that a fair reading of Mr.
Heaton's testimony shows that even Heaton's explanation places the
supposed statements in the context of the sales of the Southyard
material. That is why several pages of the transcript are cited.
A reading of this entire portion of testimony (R.451 at 7 through
19) will demonstrate this to be the case.

Treatment of this

testimony at pages 18-20 of defendants1 Reply Brief is quite
appropriate and it remains that this point of plaintiffs1 case is
far from clear and convincing.
With respect to plaintiffs' comments at page 8 of its
"Further Response," it is emphasized that it is not established
that defendants ever "refused" to make information available to
plaintiffs.

It

must

be

remembered

that

the

request

for

information came after Heaton had come in and said he was being
"investigated"; even then, there was no refusal, but simply a
request, quite natural in the face of Heaton's revelation of an
investigation of his own improper conduct, that counsel should be
- 6 -

consulted.

Plaintiffs repeat here again for the third time in

this brief the disagreements about availability of records prior
to 1985. That has been discussed above. Plaintiffs' persistence
in its description of "hand picking" of records only demonstrates
the strain in plaintiffs' case.

The 1986 and 1987 records had

been located and were available to Mr. Elkington before he arrived
as a courtesy to him because those were the records requested and
the specific ones identified in Heaton's written authorization
(Ex. 48-D; R.454 at 92; see defendants' Opening Brief, at 21-22.)
Plaintiffs' "evidence" of a supposed agreement between
Hurst and Heaton to confirm a phony amount of purchases centers on
plaintiffs' assertion (page 9 of "Further Response") that "Heaton
asked Hurst not to reveal all of his dealings with Heaton".

It

is true and undisputed that Heaton did make such a request.

But

plaintiffs overlook the further very emphatic testimony of Mr.
Hurst

that

when

Heaton

asked

him

to withhold

all

of

the

transactions, "I told him in no way would I participate in any
kind of a coverup.

I told him if, in fact, he hadn't been square

with his employer, that was his problem now and I wouldn't be
involved and I didn't want any part of being involved in an
attempt to withhold any information."

(R.454, at 89.)

The situation with respect to the commissions is amply
covered in our prior briefs.

Defendants did not ignore any
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evidence in the course of discussions on these commissions in the
prior brief and amply explained that evidence.

Plaintiffs here

present a new argument, that Mr. Hurst responded wrongly to Mr.
Elkington that no one else was involved.

Plaintiffs here utilize

their customary non-sequitur that Chris Williams was involved. As
pointed out in defendants1 earlier briefs, there is absolutely no
evidence whatsoever of Chris Williams' involvement other than her
own uncorroborated testimony about being paid a commission and the
assertion that she accompanied Heaton on a delivery of scrap
steel.

That does not place her in a situation where it was a

sinister concealment for Mr. Hurst not to have mentioned her to
Elkington on this occasion.
The matter of the stolen records is amply covered in
defendants1

Reply Brief

(pp.31-32).

Plaintiffs now further

compound their overreaching approach by lumping together the bank
statements used by defendants at trial in the same category as the
cash receipts and disbursements journal inquired about in the
earlier deposition.

This Court's review of the record will show

that this is, indeed, a side show.

The one point not raised in

plaintiffs' earlier brief is the new reference to their Request
for Production of Documents.

Plaintiffs seem to be saying that

Exhibit 53-D and the related testimony should not have been
admitted in evidence, but that is an evidentiary question not
- 8 -

asserted as a point on this appeal and should not be considered
here.
The remaining matter in plaintiffs1 "Further Response"
was already covered in plaintiffs1 earlier brief and this is but
a rehash of arguments there made.
responds to these other matters.

Defendants Reply Brief amply
The Court will not be burdened

with further discussion here.
For the reasons shown in defendants' Opening Brief and
Reply Brief, the judgment should be reversed and the case should
be dismissed.
DATED this ^ 0

day otp^U^u

JL992.

Respectfully submitted,
GARDINER & HINTZE

L. R.*Gardiner, Jr.
\
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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